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Understanding a Changing China

Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics
C. Anthony Pfaff

ABSTRACT: US officials often portray the Chinese government as having few,
if any, ethical boundaries in its pursuit of power. This article argues China, like
Western countries, has a rich ethical tradition of constraining its use of military
power. With a focus on the relationship between ways of war and ethics of war,
this article relies on traditional and contemporary scholarship from both the East
and the West to highlight differences in how each culture views the practical and
ethical aspects of war and how these views can interact. Understanding the ethical
logic available to one’s rivals can enable US leaders and planners to leverage China’s
behavior and optimally shape US policies and actions.

Keywords: comparative ethics, just war theory, China, military ethics,
strategic competition

T

he claim that the Chinese government cares little for ethical norms is
commonly made in the context of national security. For example, in December
2020, then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe stated the
Chinese government had “no ethical boundaries” in its pursuit of power.1 As Ratcliffe
further pointed out, the Chinese steal defense and proprietary secrets; suppress free
speech, even outside China’s borders; and regularly bully their neighbors over boundary
issues. Thus, the Chinese government’s apparent ethos is, as Ratcliffe describes it,
a radical utilitarianism in which the good of the Chinese Communist Party is the
only concern. Strategists might further conclude the behavior of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) in war would be no less constrained.
The fact the Chinese government might not accept US norms, does not mean it
accepts no norms. Ethics at the strategic level are about reconciling the demands of
national security with the near-universal sentiment of limiting human suffering and
the desire to conform to cultural values.2 To understand another culture’s military
ethic, strategists must understand how the culture reconciles the achievement of
success with those values and how a country’s way of war shapes its ethics of war.
Both Western and Chinese strategic traditions regarding armed conflict are rich with
strategic and ethical analysis.
In general, a Western way of war emphasizes the imposition of one’s will on an
opponent, and the Chinese way of war emphasizes convincing an adversary to accept
1. John Ratcliffe, “China Is National Security Threat No. 1,” Wall Street Journal (website), December 3, 2020,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599.
2. Martin Cook, The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2004), 21.
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Chinese interests. The ethic resulting from the former is one of competing
principles, where the task is to eliminate the enemy’s ability to resist while
avoiding harm to persons and things not necessary to this resistance and ensuring
the least expense of blood and treasure. The ethic that arises from the latter is one
of virtue that appears more permissive in terms of means and ends. The ethic,
however, deemphasizes destruction and constrains means and ends—in the ideal,
at least—by the demands of justice and benevolence.
Both East and West are inconsistent in following the practical and normative
principles of these traditions. This article, therefore, avoids assessing how well
either side lives up to its traditional ideal. Inconsistency, does not necessarily rob
these traditions of their power. Rather, inconsistencies highlight an ideal against
which state behavior can be assessed. The US commitment to human rights,
for example, was used to criticize the nation’s post-9/11 policies on interrogation
and its use of air strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan—criticisms that led to policy
changes. China has sometimes proved similarly sensitive. Despite Ratcliffe’s
charge that the Chinese government is conducting genetic experiments with its
soldiers, the country established a bioethics committee after a researcher edited
the genomes of two infants, an act the government also condemned.3
Ways and Ethics of War
Sociologist Martin Shaw describes a way of war as a method of organizing
armed conflict that reflects patterns in the practice of warfighting. Ways of war
are inherently practical and primarily focused on the threats a security community
faces and the tools it has to confront them.4 How these tools are used depends
on the security community’s understanding of the character of war, which in turn
informs its way of war, which is how it will compete and, when necessary, fight.
These choices include how to organize and equip militaries, and they determine
which strategies to adopt against a given foe. Presumably, state actors organize
their militaries to respond to the most dangerous perceived threat, and, from any
national security perspective, these threats (and the responses to them) determine
the way of war the security community adopts.5
As an ideal, ways of war inform practice, but they do not determine it. If a
country organizes to face its most serious threat, the country will not necessarily use
the same capabilities in other contexts. The United States’ commitment of military
forces to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, for example, does not suggest
3. Hepeng Jia, “China Approves Ethics Advisory Group after CRISPR-Babies Scandal,” Nature (website),
August 8, 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02362-5; and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 129–30.
4. Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005), 29, 42.
5. Colin S. Gray, “War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity,” Parameters 50, no. 2
(Summer 2010): 7.
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the country has changed its view of international competition or warfighting.
Moreover, the relationship is not unidirectional. Ethics also inform the way of war.
For example, a commitment to minimizing collateral harms, however motivated,
can encourage the development of increasingly precise weapons. Understanding
the ideal helps strategists see why opponents choose capabilities, strategies, and—
most important for this discussion—practical and ethical norms that guide how
opponents compete and fight.
Western Way of War
Drawing on the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz’s writings, the US
military, (and Western militaries more generally) tends to view the aim of war as
imposing its will on the enemy.6 While the logic of this kind of war is simple in
expression, it is difficult in application. A state has imposed its will successfully
when the enemy no longer has the capacity to resist and when it eliminates the
enemy’s capacity to resist by shutting down the enemy’s combat capability faster
than the enemy can eliminate its own. Doing so relies on a strategy of annihilation
and attrition that destroys as much enemy military capability as possible.7
The existential nature of the threat the enemy poses is another critical aspect
of this view. To underscore the close association of existential threat with the
Western way of war, Pamela Creed notes how President George W. Bush
positioned the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an existential threat that created
“character polarities” between the American people (who sacrifice to defend
their rights) and the enemy (who was fueled by an “irrational hate” for the
American way of life).8 Rather than adjudicating whether this characterization
of al-Qaeda was fair, this description was as much a response to the feeling the
United States was at war as it was a reflection of the cultural views of what it
takes to win wars.
The point here is not that the United States only goes to war against existential
threats. Rather, organizing to fight such a threat shapes the capabilities the US
military creates and the strategies it adopts. When conflict arises, an existential
threat provides little room for negotiation, leaving little else to do but eliminate
the enemy’s ability to resist. This approach closely identifies military objectives
with political ones because destroying military capability, in this view, entails
victory. This point is important. Imposing one’s will on the enemy does not mean
the enemy must adopt new goals. It simply means eliminating the enemy’s ability
to prevent the realization of goals.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1968), 101.
7. C. Anthony Pfaff, Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2011), 9.
8. Pamela Creed, Ethics, Norms, and the Narratives of War (New York: Routledge, 2013), 23.
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Put another way, imposing the United States’s will means preserving its
freedom of action while limiting the enemy’s. Imposing this will is like Max
Weber’s concept of domination. For Weber, domination entailed involuntary
obedience. He contrasted this obedience with power, which reflected an actor’s
ability to obtain voluntary compliance.9 For example, whether Saddam Hussein
accepted regime change did not matter because he could do little to prevent it. The
refusal of many, if not most, Iraqis to accept the new order did matter. Thus, the
annihilation-based strategy that worked so well in 1991 and 2003 failed against
terrorist and insurgent groups. The United States’ 2003 description of its strategy
to defeat Hussein as “shock and awe” was probably no coincidence.10
Western Ethic of War
The Western just-war tradition began with Aristotle and the tradition took
form as St. Augustine and his successors in the Roman Catholic Church wrestled
with the demands of state. Then, thinkers such as Hugo Grotius secularized its
principles. Grotius is generally credited as being one of the first jurists to describe
a set of laws for armed conflict. Beginning in the 1860s, when Henri Dunant
proposed the first Geneva Conventions and Francis Lieber drew up a code
of conduct for Union soldiers in the American Civil War, the principles of the
just-war tradition found their way into international law.11
In general, the just-war tradition permits war for self-defense or the defense of
others against an act of aggression, which is understood as a violation of political
sovereignty or territorial integrity.12 Although not every violation of sovereignty
or territory represents an existential threat, the idea of such a violation is central
to justifications for war. For example, though Iraq was not an existential threat
to the United States in 1991, the existential threat it posed to Kuwait featured
prominently in the rationale for war.13 Violating another’s sovereignty or territory
may be permitted to prevent a gross violation of human rights or a humanitarian
disaster, both of which are existential in nature. Other conditions must
also hold, including legitimate authority, public declaration, last resort, likelihood
of success, proportionality, and proper intent, for some just-war thinkers like
9. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), 53.
10. John T. Correll, “What Happened to Shock and Awe?,” Air Force Magazine (website), November 3, 2003,
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1103shock/.
11. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press, 2006), 9–26; and “The ICRC
and the Geneva Convention (1863–1864), International Committee for the Red Cross (website), December 29,
2004, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jnvt.htm.
12. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book II, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2005), quoted in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse,
and Endre Begby (Malden, MA: Blackwell Press, 2006), 401–404; and Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 62.
13. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 220.
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St. Augustine.14 Taken together, these conditions constrain when the US
military may pursue even a just cause, thus ensuring violence is not committed for
trivial or futile ends.
In this view, winning wars emphasizes the destruction of enemy military
capability and logically excludes things that do not directly contribute to this
capability. Combatants must discriminate between targets associated with the
enemy’s military capability and those that are not, and only use force proportional
to the value of the military objective. The Western just-war tradition also
excludes other things, regardless of how they contribute to enemy military
capability, such as hospitals and infrastructure associated with food and water,
even if they are used by the military. Justifications for these exclusions include
human rights and setting conditions for a better state of peace.15
For ethical decision making, the Western military ethic places three
imperatives in tension: the imperative to win, the imperative to protect the
force, and the imperative to avoid noncombatant and other collateral harms. The
imperative to win draws moral justification from the justice of the cause. The
imperative to protect the force draws justification from both the conservation of
forces from the standpoint of the first imperative and soldiers having the right not
to be sacrificed for inadequate reason. Finally, the imperative to avoid harming
noncombatants and committing other collateral harms draws justification from
the notion that doing so is gratuitous in some cases and unethical in others.
Even when excluded things might facilitate the destruction of enemy forces,
avoiding them does not prevent it.16
The United States and its partners have not always used force as discriminately
as their ethics generally require, but violating a norm is different from rejecting
it. Normative power is expressed both in terms of compliance and in terms of
how others respond to violations. For example, Sir Arthur Harris, also known
as “Bomber Harris,” who directed an indiscriminate bombing campaign against
German cities in World War II, was “slighted and snubbed” after the war and
did not receive the honors others of similar rank and experience did. Moreover,
though the names of the fighter pilots who died during the Battle of Britain
are inscribed on plaques at Westminster Abbey, the plaques do not mention the
Royal Air Force Bomber Command or its crews.17 In fact, despite conducting
indiscriminate bombing campaigns against Japanese cities after the war, the
14. Orend, Morality of War, 31–62, 90–96.
15. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 135; and Jeff McMahan, “Realism, Morality, and War,” in The Ethics
of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 88.
16. Pfaff, Resolving Ethical Challenges, 8.
17. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 323–25.
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United States endorsed additions to the Geneva Conventions that reinforced the
protection of civilians as a legal requirement.18
Chinese Way of War
Both Western and Chinese views on military matters have a long, complex,
and intellectually rich history. Strategists must be careful about reducing these
matters to one school of thought, much less one thinker. Nonetheless, just as
Clausewitz has an outsize influence on Western thinking, Sun Tzu has the same
effect on Chinese thought. Ping-cheung Lo, a contemporary scholar of Chinese
military ethics, remarks that contemporary Chinese discourse on The Art of War
is “dominated by PLA authors.”19 Of course, both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are
read in both the United States and China. Sun Tzu’s methods, however, have
not informed the US way of war in the same way they appear to have informed
the Chinese way.
Western readers are likely familiar with Unrestricted Warfare, one of the
most prominent applications of Sun Tzu. Written by Chinese then-colonels
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, this book contrasts Sun Tzu with Clausewitz,
arguing China should follow an unrestricted warfare strategy because no
competitors are able to impose their will on the United States, given its
conventional superiority. The colonels call for “using all means, including armed
force or nonarmed force, military and nonmilitary, and lethal and nonlethal
means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”20
This view would exploit the point where the Western way of war closes
the gap between military and political objectives. Since political and military
objectives do not have a necessary connection, success depends on bringing to
bear other elements of national power and integrating them into the military
effort. This feature necessarily draws in nonviolent means of competition that
emphasize coercion and deception, which Weber would have referred to as
“power,” as opposed to brute force and attrition, which he would have referred
to as “domination.”21 While brute force has its place, its use reflects a failure of
the ideal and, thus, should be the exception rather than the rule.22 Moreover, this
view connects the nature and quality of civil governance with military capability
because the civil government wields the full range of the tools of conflict. In this
18. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, ed., Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 271–72.
19. Ping-cheung Lo, “Warfare Ethics in Sunzi’s Art of War? Historical Controversies and Contemporary
Perspectives,” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 2 (August 2012): 124.
20. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing
House, February 1999), 7.
21. Weber, Economy and Society, 53.
22. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 122.
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context, Confucian writers notably prefaced their works on military affairs with
discussions of statecraft.23
Additionally, each way of war seeks to realize the ends of war differently.
In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, François Jullien
contrasts Western “means-ends” thinking with Chinese “opportunism.”24 Although
the term “Western” may not accurately and completely describe US strategic
decision making, Jullien observes Western military thinking determines the
right objective and then tries to organize the resources available to
achieve it. In this way, a general engaging in battle is much like a ship
captain undertaking a voyage. As Jullien observes, “[B]oth operate within
constantly shifting fields, full of unpredictabilities, to the very end never certain
of triumphing over the enemy or making it to port.”25 Success is never guaranteed;
friction and chance can always undo the best plans.
According to Jullien, Chinese thinking analyzes a situation in terms of the
potential to gain from it. The generals’ role here is to understand what factors
promote their interests and then act when those factors align to advance the
interests. Sun Tzu captures the difference in chapter four when he states,
“The victorious troops thus begin by winning and only then engage in battle,
whereas the defeated troops begin by engaging in battle and only then try to
win.”26 Put another way, the troops see the potential first, and then they engage
to realize the potential. Like Jullien’s description of the Western view, the
Chinese view acknowledges some factors will always be uncontrollable. Rather
than trying to control or to minimize the factors’ effects on achieving the intended
objective, the Chinese view avoids setting a single, discrete objective in the first
place and seeks to identify and act on opportunities to improve one’s situation
relative to the enemy. In further describing the Chinese view, Jullien states,
“[C]ircumstances may often be unforeseen, even unforeseeable, and
unprecedented, which is why it is not possible to draw up a plan in advance.
Rather, they contain a certain potential from which, if we are agile and adaptable,
we can profit.”27
The approach described here is reflected in Chinese doctrine. In response to
superior US conventional capabilities, the PLA employs a concept of shashoujian
or “assassin’s mace,” an umbrella term that refers to the doctrinal development
and acquisition of weapons systems aimed at enabling the inferior to defeat
23. Ping-cheung Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft and Warfare Ethics in Early China,” in Chinese Just War Ethics:
Origin, Development, and Dissent, ed. Ping-cheung Lo and Sumner B. Twiss (New York: Routledge, 2015), 8.
24. François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, trans. Janet Lloyd (Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004).
25. Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 40–41.
26. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samul B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971), 55,
quoted in Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 42–43.
27. Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 38–39.
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the superior.28 This doctrine relies on surprise and deceptive and unorthodox
methods “unknown to an adversary.” The means employed under this doctrine—
such as those described above—are intended to achieve the effects of deterring,
decapitating, blinding, paralyzing, or disintegrating enemy forces. Interestingly,
disintegration in this context refers to breaking down command and control.29
“Destroying” the enemy does not make this list. This omission fits into a view that
sees the use of force—and the other elements of national power—as a means to
limit conflict and avoid escalation to conventional war—which, being the weaker
power, the PLA would likely lose.
Paradoxically, a view that seeks to limit conflict can expand the roles force
can play. As Zheng Wang argues in Never Forget National Humiliation, China’s
perceived humiliation by the West serves as a barrier to negotiation and trust
and places the West and China in conflict from which they cannot escape.
Consequently, future perceived humiliations could paradoxically escalate
into war. For example, in 1995 after the Clinton administration permitted
then-President of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui to travel to the United States to
deliver the commencement address at his alma mater Cornell University, China
recalled its ambassador from Washington, rejected the appointment of a new
US ambassador to China, and conducted large-scale military exercises. As Wang
describes, “A very strong sense of crisis and insecurity has become an important
theme of the national political discourse in China.”30 Nothing indicates the
situation would have escalated to violence; however, the inclusion of the
military in China’s response to the perceived political affront underscores
the seriousness with which the Chinese take such offenses. Imagining a set of
circumstances that would lead to a greater crisis is difficult.
Fear of future humiliation is not the only normative principle driving
Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, nothing in this analysis should suggest
China’s competition with the United States is motivated by anything but a desire
to surpass it as a global power, as described in Jonathan Ward’s China’s Vision of
Victory, or to establish an international order China considers more favorable,
as described in Rush Doshi’s The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace
American Order.31 Nor should this analysis suggest China and the United States’
28. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July–August 2009);
and Jason E. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying Shashoujian: China’s ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Concept,” in Civil Military
Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2004), 333.
29. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying Shashoujian,” 341, 344.
30. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 132, 165, 184.
31. Jonathan D. T. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Arlington, VA: Atlas Publishing and Media Company
LLC, 2019), 20; and Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 3.
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views of just order are moral equivalents. However, an ethic exists that can guide
both the ends China seeks and the means used to seek them.
Chinese Ethic of War
In practice, the PLA grounds its military ethics in Marxist-Leninist ideology,
which typically expresses itself as a kind of utilitarianism in which socialism is
to be advanced to the maximum extent practicable.32 Nevertheless, since the
1980s, traditional Chinese thought, especially Confucianism, has found its way
back into Chinese civic culture as an antidote to encroaching Western values.33
Not surprisingly, such thinking has migrated to the military, which has integrated
traditional views with its military ethics programs that reflect a socialist foundation
with Chinese characteristics.34 These traditional ethics took shape largely during
the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), during which boundaries were
in flux, leading to brutal wars as larger states consolidated power. This competition
gave rise to schools of thought that asked the question, “Can a nation govern so
well that it becomes a great power, and how should it moderate the destruction
that works against its great-power status?” Eventually, Confucianism would
be established as a kind of state religion that informed how dynasties that
consolidated power would govern and fight.35
The writing of contemporary PLA scholar Zhao Feng reflects these ethics.
Zhao Feng argues for “moral warfare,” in which one seeks to be morally superior
to one’s enemy.36 Such a view may appear on the surface as a particularly cynical
form of information warfare. Yet, for moral warfare to be effective, practitioners
must make an honest attempt to be moral. If not, they must present a stronger
moral case than the enemy does. This observation opens the door to the kind
of traditional just-war thinking described above, which, like its Western
counterpart, generally favors avoiding aggression and employing means that
limit destruction and the loss of innocent lives.
On the surface, an ethic of war based on Sun Tzu’s work seems odd.
Indeed, Chinese works on war during the Warring States period often offered no
moral justifications for the resort to, or the use of arms, against another state and
often argued resorting to war to increase the state’s territory or power was equally
32. Mark Metcalf, “In the Service of Military Combat Readiness: A Survey of 21st Century PLA Scholarship
on the Role of Military Ethics in Warfare” (unpublished manuscript, December 6, 2019), Microsoft Word file.
33. Yi-Huah Jiang, “Confucian Political Theory in Contemporary China,” Annual Review of Political Science
21 (2018): 156–63; and Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
34. Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
35. Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft,” 3–7.
36. Zhao Feng, “军事伦理学应当研究道德战范畴” [Military ethics should investigate the scope of moral
war], 南京政治学院学报 [ Journal of Nanjing Institute of Politics] 19, no. 4 (2003): 86–88, quoted in
Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
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justified as wars of defense.37 Sun Tzu’s work falls into this category of amoral analysis
of warfare. Of the seven military classics, Sun Tzu’s is best known for the
absence of ethical thought and was criticized by contemporary Confucian thinkers
for this absence.38
Confucian thought makes an important contribution to Chinese military
ethical traditions. For example, Mencius, an early Confucian thinker, condemned
aggressive wars intended to expand territory and, in the spirit of the Western
concept of jus ad bellum (or the “justice of going to war”), “encourage[d] wars of
self-defense against aggression” as well as “punitive expeditions” undertaken by
rightfully authorized state actors to address a perceived wrong.39 The Spring and
Autumn Annals, believed to have been written by Confucius himself, specifies
self-defense, rectifying an injustice, and humanitarian intervention as conditions
for a just war while excluding preemption. Also, like Western just-war traditions,
these works include conditions such as legitimate authority, right intention,
and public declaration.40 Unlike the Western tradition, Confucius’s view, at
least as expressed in the Spring and Autumn Annals, qualifies the granting of
permission to go to war with the concept of ren, which places an emphasis on
humanity. So, even a putative just cause like self-defense may fall short of being
moral if its pursuit diminishes human flourishing.41
Mencius advocated for jus in bello (or “justice in war”) notions of immunity for
noncombatants and limited destruction. Other thinkers, like Xunzi, contributed
concepts such as “legitimate authority,” which includes justice and humanity as a
prerequisite for this legitimacy—an inclusion compatible with Western views.42
Moreover, this justice and humanity extend from the character of the ruler to the
conduct of war itself.43 In this way, the just (yi) and benevolent (ren) character of
the ruler constrains both when he can fight and how.44
Although this Confucian contribution arose out of concerns that views like
Sun Tzu’s did not adequately address ethical matters, the interpretation of The Art
of War as amoral may not be the best one. Prudential and moral norms are found
throughout the entirety of the text. Emphasizing restraint, Sun Tzu argues at the
beginning that war should be avoided, but when this fails, one should only rely “on
37. David Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” in The Prism of Just War: Asian and
Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military Force, ed. Howard M. Hensel (New York:
Routledge, 2016), 196–97.
38. Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft,” 115.
39. Aaron Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis of War and Some of Its Contemporary Implications,” Journal
of Military Ethics 11, no. 2 (August 2012): 98.
40. Kam-por Yu, “Confucian Views on War as Seen in the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and
Autumn Annals,” Dao 9, no. 1 (March 2010): 104–5.
41. Yu, “Confucian Views on War,” 110.
42. Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis,” 98.
43. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 200.
44. Lo and Twiss, Chinese Just War Ethics, 8.
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smart strategies and tactics rather than a display of maximum force.” Moreover,
Sun Tzu, argues for a way of war that prefers preservation to destruction,
even when considering enemy formations.45 Of course, practical reasons for
preferring preservation exist. As Andrew Seth Meyer observes, Sun-Tzu insists
“every casualty of battle represents a loss for the victorious commander and his
ruler: every friendly soldier killed was of course an asset lost, but every enemy
soldier killed, every enemy provision destroyed, and every enemy fortification
razed were also potential assets forfeited.”46
In this regard, the interpretation of Sun Tzu’s work as “coldly pragmatic” is
not surprising.47 His concern was armies consume resources, and, as a result,
their use of resources must generate more resources than have been consumed;
otherwise, both war and the state are unsustainable.48 Understanding the continuity
between governance and military affairs not generally present in Western
thought is important. For both Sun Tzu and Confucian thinkers of the time,
“virtue, benevolence, and righteousness” served a “force multiplier” that increased
one’s chance for, if not guaranteed, victory. Sun Tzu may have diverged from
Confucian thinkers on the last point. He saw moral superiority as an advantage,
but one that was neither a necessary nor sufficient requirement for victory.49
Mencius and Xunzi, like others at the time, did see moral superiority as such
a requirement.50 Sun Tzu’s preference for restraint seems to arise from previous
moral commitments to a just and benevolent order, not simply a means of
effective resource management. Thus, Lo sees Sun Tzu’s ethics as similar to
those argued for by Henry Sidgwick, whose utilitarian “two-fold rule” insisted
force should only be used in pursuit of objectives that will lead to victory,
which serves a just cause—and, even then, only as much as is proportional to
the value of the objective.51 Although such an ethic does not fully account for
all intuitions about the morality of war, it does prohibit attacking purely civilian
targets and the disproportionate uses of force, regardless of the argument
made about the overall effect on ending the war successfully. Moreover, as
Michael Walzer notes, Sidgwick’s rule—and, by extension, Sun Tzu’s preferences—
at least establishes rules of war exist, which further distinguishes it from
murder or robbery.52

45. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 118.
46. Andrew Seth Meyer, trans., The Dao of the Military: Liu An’s Art of War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012), 13.
47. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 202.
48. Meyer, Dao of the Military, 14.
49. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 209, 201.
50. Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis,” 101; and Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 200.
51. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 120–22; and Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 129.
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Sun Tzu’s account is not entirely utilitarian in the same way Sidgwick’s is.
Maximizing victory in service to a just cause says nothing about the justice of
an act. Indeed, a major criticism of Sidgwick’s view is it permits too much: No
act, no matter how vicious or indiscriminate, would be impermissible as long
as it contributed to victory and the harm that was committed was proportional
to the contribution. If strategists accept Sun Tzu’s view is—or at least can be—
compatible with the Confucian concerns described, then acts of violence and
coercion maximizing a just and benevolent order would be insufficient because
these conditions would not stray very far from Sidgwick’s view. Rather, to the
extent acts of violence and coercion serve justice and benevolence, they must retain
the character of these virtues.
Many of these ideas have been expressed in some form in official Chinese
documents. Three scholars from the PLA Army Engineering University pointed
out China’s 2013 national defense white paper intentionally promulgated a military
ethic centered on the ideas of “justice, peace, and humanitarianism” that drew on
both historical and contemporary texts.53 These sentiments are reaffirmed in the
2019 national defense white paper.54 Although neither paper specifically references
military ethics, each expresses a set of norms Confucius would recognize. Thus,
blending Sun Tzu and Confucian views on the conduct of war, strategists end
up with an approach that more closely resembles neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics,
emphasizing the agent as opposed to the act.
Like utilitarian accounts, virtue ethics do not rule out any act. Unlike
utilitarianism, virtue ethics include character traits associated with the human
good.55 This complex idea of human good, often described as “flourishing,”
rests on the notion that virtues facilitate the fulfillment of human potential.
Thus, these traits would rule out acts that maximize a good, like happiness or
interest, if the acts did not also reflect the virtue. Since agents must discern the
best way to achieve an end, practical reason is inseparable from virtue.56 What
matters is what the virtuous person would do given the alternatives at hand. If
all the alternatives are terrible, then the virtuous person may do terrible things,
though the person would generally choose the least terrible alternative.

53. Zheng Zhen, Zhang Liping, and Hao Lihua, “Transcending Language and Promulgating Military
Ethics from the English Translation of the 2013 China National Defense Strategy,” Journal of English Studies
1 (2015), quoted in Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness”; and State Council Information Office of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council
Information Office of the PRC, 2013).
54. State Council Information Office of the PRC, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing:
State Council of the PRC, 2019).
55. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25.
56. Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (New York: Clarendon Press,
1989), 3–4.
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Similarly, a Confucian ethic requires the authority who wages war to have
the “mandate of heaven,” which requires rulers to possess the virtues of justice
and benevolence.57 Such virtues, when applied to war, may also appear utilitarian
in application; however, they are constrained by nonutilitarian, humanitarian
concerns associated with the relevant virtue. To the extent such an ethic is
followed, it will constrain action where Sidgwick does not. Possessing these
virtues requires rulers to subordinate their interests to the good of the people
over whom they rule, suggesting an independent standard against which rulers
can be criticized. For example, a ruler of the Zhou dynasty putting the interests
of his concubine over the needs of his army was seen as a moral failure subject
to criticism, if not remorse.58
Although Sun Tzu’s ethics may not be as fully developed as those of other
thinkers of the time, the privileging of just and benevolent governance as
the authority for the use of force suggests his commitment to restraint is
not merely pragmatic; rather it rests on a deeper notion of human flourishing.
Considered this way, Sun Tzu’s work may be more compatible with Confucian
thought than it first appears to be. This notion of restraint harmonizes with
an understanding of war that sees its purpose as shaping interests rather than
imposing will. Shaping interests requires the adversary to have sufficient
capability and capacity to act in a desired way; widespread destruction would
undermine this end.
Shifting the emphasis from imposing the state’s will to changing the enemy’s
mind means focusing on engaging the people rather than destroying the enemy.
Whereas the Western ethic seeks to employ the most force permissible; given the
limits of discrimination and proportionality, the Chinese view seeks to use the
least force possible given the demands of a just and benevolent order.
Conclusion
This article has avoided assessments of how well the United States and
China uphold their traditions. The deceptive practices former Director of
National Intelligence Ratcliffe complained about may be violations by traditional
Chinese standards. The employment of these practices, however, can appear
justified, given both their efficacy and their lowering of the chance of escalation.
Still, when a government does not adhere to its ethics, it becomes vulnerable
to moral critique, which can have practical consequences should the critique
undermine the actor’s legitimacy.
57. Philip J. Ivanhoe, “ ‘Heaven’s Mandate’ and the Concept of War in Early Confucianism,” in Ethics
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 272.
58. Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993), 3–4.
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This article should clearly convey Western and Chinese just-war traditions
have more similarities than differences. Whatever happens in practice, both
cultures rely on long traditions that specify when war is justified and constrain the
actions taken in its conduct. In addition, these permissions are similar because they
incorporate conceptions of justice and permit war only to promote this justice,
and both traditions recognize certain persons and things should be excluded from
harm, independent of how this exclusion would impact the chances for victory.
To the extent Western and Chinese war-ethics traditions are different, these
differences may lie in the Chinese emphasis on humanity and human flourishing
that can look like consequentialist reasoning and, when done poorly, likely is.
In fact, the Marxist-Leninist ethic, which clearly places the party’s good above
just about everything else, is frequently in tension with China’s more traditional
ideals, often resulting in catastrophic decisions, such as the one to intern
ethnic Uighurs.
This article has focused on ideals within two rich and complex traditions. As
a result, the utility of its analysis is limited to the extent the practical and moral
traditons discussed here have impacted Western and Chinese views. The literature
suggests this impact has been influential in each case. Human difficulty with ideals,
however, ensures there will be numerous exceptions to the ideals. Moreover, war is
evolutionary, and no way of war or its ethic is static or enduring. Although a way
of war like Sun Tzu’sm which relies on coercion and deception, may prevail over
one that emphasizes firepower and destruction, a new way will evolve in response.
Strategists developing this new way of war will be responsible for ensuring the
resulting ethic is one that harmonizes with both the requirement to win and the
demands of human flourishing.
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